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ften defined as “unfinished business”, the European Union’s market integration process 
appears to have become more fragile than ever at the beginning of the new decade. Already 
in 2010, the Monti report denounced the existence of a Single Market “fatigue”, which made it 
difficult to complete the market integration process, especially in most difficult areas such as 
services.1 Today, Brexit potentially threatens the future attractiveness of the Single Market, by 
depriving the Union of its third largest economy and leading to an unprecedented thorn in the 
EU’s pride, as a Member of the Union sets sail. At the same time, the post-Brexit single market 
may become more cohesive and ambitious, as one of the most reluctant Member States leaves 
the group: the Union may also have the opportunity to re-discover some of the features of 
continental Europe’s legal and economic traditions, from Civil Law rules to state-led industrial 
policy, which faced obstacles when the UK was in the Union.2  
 Against this background, the challenges for the Single Market project do not end with 
Brexit. To the contrary, EU policymakers are confronted with a frustrating prospect: as they try 
to complete the Single Market, technological evolution is pushing the frontier of integration 
further, requiring new efforts and policies to fully achieve the desired goal. In particular, the 
digital transformation is changing the traditional, textbook economics of market integration, 
based on tenets such as economies of scale and the four freedoms. The rise of the digital 
economy requires a radical change in the policies for the Single Market, as well as in the trade 
policies that underpin the whole market integration process. Trends such as the virtualisation, 
servitisation and platformisation of the economy (as described below), coupled with the rise of 
the Internet of Things and Artificial Intelligence, make market integration at once more 
appealing and increasingly challenging for EU policymakers, projecting the Single Market into 
a complete new dimension, in which the “Fifth Freedom” (the free circulation of non-personal 
data) is intertwined with new concerns with the need to protect fundamental rights, and at the 
same time secure Europe’s technological sovereignty.  
 As EU institutions were struggling to complete the ambitious Digital Single Market 
strategy formulated by the Juncker Commission, technology has changed so fast that brand 
new policy initiatives are needed: the Von der Leyen Commission seems to have marked a 
significant change towards a more assertive and future-oriented approach to digital policy. The 
new pillars of the Single Market 2.0 are not focused anymore on platform regulation, data 
protection and the free flow of non-personal data; while these remain very important pillars, 
the future of the Single Market will require that the whole internal market is seen as a layered 
ecosystem, in which infrastructure, rules, protocols and standards become a platform for large 
and small companies to develop value added solutions to the benefit of all European 
consumers. This “EaaP” (“Europe as a Platform”) approach may also induce a change of 
terminology: what used to be mutual recognition will now mostly be related to interoperability; 
what used to be subsidiarity is translated into a choice between centralised, distributed and 
decentralised governance; open interconnection becomes “open API”, and is applied far 
beyond network industries; and the free circulation of people is enhanced with a strong digital 
                                                          
 
* Forthcoming in S Garben & I Govaere, The Internal Market 2.0 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2020). 
** Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. Professor of Digital Innovation, College of Europe. Member of the EU High 
Level Expert Group on AI. 
1 See “A new strategy for the Single Market. At the service of Europe’s economy and society”. Report to the 
President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, by Mario Monti. 9 May 2010. 
2 D Kalff and A Renda, ‘Hidden Treasures. Mapping Europe’s Sources of Competitiveness Advantage in Doing 
Business’ (2019) CEPS Monograph and A Bradford, The Brussels Effect. How the European Union Rules the World 
(Oxford University Press, March 2020).  
O 
3 
identity and verification layer. Importantly, especially after the appointment of Commissioner 
Thierry Breton, the Single Market 2.0 is becoming the locus of data spaces and ecosystems 
as the basic pillars of the future EU “competitive sustainability” agenda.  
 To be sure, achieving the Single Market 2.0 requires strong political commitment and 
will not prove easy, if the foundations of economic integration will remain as fragile as they are 
today. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown very clearly the difficulty of keeping the EU’s 
“crown jewel” alive in times of despair and shortage of essential goods, such as medical 
protective equipment. The deterioration of the rule of law in some of the Member States (eg 
Poland, Hungary), the suspension of Schengen, the overall lack of solidarity between Member 
States and the temptation to use digital technology (eg, in the form of contact-tracing apps) in 
a way that jeopardises fundamental rights, are only a few examples of a more general crisis of 
the European integration project, which the von der Leyen Commission has barely managed 
to contain. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic is also accelerating the digital 
transformation, with the online economy becoming paramount for economic and social 
relations: this, in turn, makes the development of rules and standard for a trustworthy Single 
Market even more urgent.3   
 Can code succeed where law and politics have so far partly failed? In the remainder of 
this chapter, I outline the possible contours of a “Single Market 2.0”. Section I below describes 
the current and the upcoming waves of digital transformation as featuring very different 
economic paradigms and consequences for EU policy. Section II discusses the reconfiguration 
of the Single Market as a layered ecosystem and describe the current Digital Single Market 
Strategy and the upcoming initiatives outlined by the European Commission, and partly 
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Section III provides a layered architecture for the Single 
Market 2.0 and outlines possible further avenues to speed up reform in a way that is consistent 
with all the cornerstones of the EU strategy for growth and sustainable development. 
  
I. Two Waves of Internet Evolution 
 
Information technology (IT) experts traditionally approach architectural problems through 
modular structures, by distinguishing different layers and components of complex system 
goods and working through different options as regards on their interoperability.4 Different 
choices in this respect lead to more closed architectures (eg the early Apple Macintosh), or 
more open architectures, in which different layers and components can be produced according 
to standard specifications by more than one firm (eg the early Microsoft Windows). The history 
of IT also suggests that no governance architecture is fully open, and typically one or more 
layers become dominated by one or a few players due to the emergence of network 
externalities, which lead to “winner-take-all” effects and often highly concentrated market 
structures at some of the layers.5  
 The Internet is itself depicted as a complex layered architecture, based on a massive 
physical layer, encompassing fixed and wireless communications systems, submarine cables 
and satellite systems, massive Internet Exchanges and data centres. The Internet age 
constituted a major enhancement of the original layered architecture of the personal computer, 
with the introduction of global-scale networking possibilities between computers and similar 
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devices at the physical layer, and the definition of open protocols and standards that defined 
the traffic rules for data at the so-called “logical layer”. Open standards such as the Internet 
Protocol and the File Transfer Protocol defined the characteristics of the Internet as a means 
of communication: as observed already in the 1990s by Lawrence Lessig, in a digital 
environment, “code, not law, defines what’s possible”.6 In the case of the early Internet, the 
openness and neutrality of the standards defined at the logical layer determined the rise of the 
Internet as a formidable means of communication between peers, and a vehicle for 
permissionless innovation, in which at once users could preserve their anonymity (“nobody 
knows you are a dog”, as in Peter Steiner’s fortunate New Yorker cartoon in 1993); and 
developers could work on their applications without having to seek anyone’s permission to 
reach the marketplace.  
 That said, the Internet exacerbated the features of the original layered architecture of 
the personal computer: the introduction of a new layer, with an end-to7-end architecture and a 
growing ability to support data flows, generated an explosion in the amount of data available 
to end users, which in turn converted into a “poverty of attention”.8 The firms that managed to 
capture a significant share of that scarce resource (user attention), ended up becoming trillion-
dollar corporations, or (as they are sometimes called in the economics literature) “superstar 
firms”. Accordingly, the rise of the digital, interconnected economy has also coincided with a 
rapid, necessary transformation of the ecosystem dynamics, which would soon come back to 
haunt the early creators of the Internet, facing them with a rising market concentration, a 
declining neutrality, and gradual attempts to depart from the original end-to-end design.9 This 
is what I call the “first wave of transformation” of the Internet. 
 
A. The First Transformation of the Internet: Virtualisation, Servitisation and 
Platformisation 
 
During the past two decades, the Internet has undergone a swift transformation, which led to 
the emergence of a more diverse layered architecture, and very peculiar forms of governance 
that hardly existed in the “brick and mortar” world. Understanding them is useful to identify the 
direction taken by the EU institutions in trying to reap the benefits of the digital ecosystem, at 
the same time minimising its associated risks. 
 First, the emergence of an end-to-end infrastructure, fuelled by growing computing 
capacity, high capacity networks and wireless connectivity, grandly expanded the possibilities 
of the digital economy to permeate the economy. The emergence of cloud computing made it 
possible for small companies to avoid buying or leasing hardware and downloading software 
and applications: these traditional transactions were replaced by “everything as a service”, 
which led to enormous advantages both for individuals and businesses. The transition towards 
a “cloud era” allowed personal devices to become increasingly agile, while users were able to 
access hardware and software located in the cloud, as well as retrieve their files from 
cyberspace. Put more simply, a limitless “office LAN” where the main server was not located 
downstairs, but potentially on the other side of the globe.10 This was the realisation of the so-
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called “age of access” already evoked by scholars in the 1990s. An age in which products and 
services are dematerialised to an extent that ownership and property rights become less 
important, and access rights become gradually more dominant.11 The progress observed in 
ubiquitous connectivity and in compression techniques, coupled with enhanced possibilities to 
capture end users’ attention, has gradually led to the emergence of access-based services. 
These include a variety of new business models, from pure streaming-based content access 
services (Netflix, Spotify) to intermediate forms (Apple Music + iTunes + Apple TV) which 
contemplate both ownership and access; and the so-called “sharing economy”, based on a 
combination of network effects, granularity, and reputational effects (eg Airbnb, Uber). Many 
of these services rely on the “cloud” as a key resource for virtual access and use of IT 
resources.12  
 Thanks to the end-to-end nature of the Internet, the digitisation of information and ever-
increasing capacity and connectivity, many parts of the economy have gradually transitioned 
towards virtualisation and servitisation, two intertwined phenomena that made the economy 
more agile, but also came with a price to pay in terms of inequality.13 The “uberisation” of many 
sectors such as passenger transport, accommodation, child care, handyman jobs, IT work (eg 
Mechanical Turk, Upwork) and low-skilled jobs and many other markets has led to extreme 
situations in which humans, themselves, are offered “as a service”.14  
 The end-to-end, digitised nature of the Internet also determined the rise of peer-to-peer 
interaction in various forms. The transition towards an access-based economy initially affected 
audiovisual content, creating significant disruption (first with peer-to-peer file-sharing, later with 
streaming-based services that almost restore the industry’s profitability). Later, the rise of the 
collaborative economy reached unprecedented levels: in 2019 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
valued the worldwide sharing economy at USD250b and further estimated that USD6 trillion in 
commerce could be disrupted by the sharing economy across sectors such as transportation, 
travel, food, retail and the media. This, representing approximately 8% of global GDP, is 
supported ia by the fact that eight of the world’s 10 largest start-ups based on valuation are in 
fact sharing economy businesses. And is likely to be further exacerbated by the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which led to an explosion in the demand for online services.  
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 The proliferation of information sources and the need to store and retrieve data for a 
multitude of user transactions also led to the rise of a fierce competition for user attention (so-
called “competition for eyeballs”). The explosion of Internet traffic in the 1990s and 2000s, 
powered by parallel streams of evolving technologies (data storage, broadband 
communications, data compression, innovation in traffic management) led to an emerging 
need for solutions that would reduce complexity: this solution was spontaneously developed 
by market forces, and mostly took the form of industry convergence towards a limited number 
of de facto industry standards at the higher layers of the architecture.15 Today, the digital 
ecosystem has evolved into a much more diverse environment: the original open internet 
architecture co-exists with various multi-sided platforms, which coordinate, steer and manage 
the innovation taking place at the higher layer of the Internet architecture. This phenomenon, 
often called “platformisation”, bears far-reaching consequences for innovation, competition and 
public policy.16  
 While a full review of the impact of platformisation on public policy would go beyond 
the scope of this chapter, it is worth looking at the peculiar governance features of platforms, 
as well as their impact on value distribution in the digital economy. A close look suggests that 
they are different from the traditional corporations. They are, indeed, a hybrid between the firm 
and the market, compared to the traditional distinction made in social sciences.17 So-called 
multi-sided platforms are hierarchical structures serving various categories of users, in which 
most of the traditional activities of a firm are outsourced, automated, or “heteromated” 
(automated through the help of third parties).18 A good example is Uber, a ride-hailing platform 
that matches independent contractors (drivers) with end users (passengers), in which the 
management and control of the former is largely done through a combination of algorithms and 
user reviews. The corporate structure and size of the firm in terms of factors of production 
(capital and labour) is extremely small compared to the amount of transactions that the platform 
generates and profits from. For example, Uber has approximately 20,000 employees, but 
“employs” more than four million drivers. 
 The peculiar structure of platforms, their relatively small size, and the powerful network 
externalities that sustain their competitive position in the market contribute to strengthening 
their bargaining power vis à vis all categories of users. Such stronger market power 
increasingly contrasted with a regulatory approach that largely left these powerful 
intermediaries untouched, as a legacy of the early days of the “neutral” internet. The 
platformisation of the Internet had little to do with the early vision of a neutral, end-to-end 
“network of networks”, open to all for permissionless innovation. Rather, it led to the rise of 
new gatekeepers, which occupy an almost unattackable position and continue to reap a large 
share of the value associated with the transactions they not-so-neutrally orchestrate. Not 
surprisingly, the need to govern the humongous amount of data their ecosystems generate 
also led these companies to increasingly invest gigantic sums in data-hungry machine learning 
systems, which came to dominate the digital environment as well as the AI landscape. From 
Netflix’s recommendation system to Google’s search engine, enormous investment has 
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reinforced and ringfenced the market positioning of these platforms, enabling them to 
personalise product offerings, prices and conditions to an extent that no competitor could even 
come close to attaining.  
 Virtualisation, servitisation and platformisation have been extremely important drivers 
of change of the Internet ecosystem in the past two decades and have led to a massive change 
in the economy, largely consisting in a re-intermediation, rather than a dis-intermediation, of 
previous market transactions. Where the new business models have preserved the original 
end-to-end nature of the Internet, new governance forms such as distributed ledger 
technologies have started to surface, thanks to technological advances, cost reductions and 
the possibility to rely on peer-to-peer computing and the power of direct network externalities. 
Where companies have departed from the original architecture, multi-sided markets have 
replicated the characteristics of one-to-many communications systems, such as television (eg 
Netflix), and have largely profited from indirect network externalities. The thirst for personal 
data, coupled with the users’ relative lack of awareness of the value of the data they shared 
and contributed to the working of large-scale algorithms, led these digital intermediaries to 
prosper by shrinking their size compared to the traditional firm, externalising most functions, 
reaping advertising benefits and enjoying a largely unregulated space.  
Not surprisingly, this first wave of digital transformation created important tensions among 
regulators, in particular in the European Union. The more digital transformation was 
permeating traditional markets, the more the differences in the regulatory treatment of 
incumbent players and digital firms started to tilt the market balance in favour of the latter. The 
greater the diffusion of data-driven business models, the greater the tensions in terms of data 
protection, and the loss of control of personal data for end users. The stronger the centripetal 
forces unleashed by network externalities and platformisation, the greater the polarisation of 
market power and profits in the hands of a fistful of companies.19 The more multi-sided 
platforms conquered the market, the more precarious most workers’ conditions became, the 
more obscure the algorithmic practices behind their selection and reward, and the weaker their 
access to social dialogue. The greater the imbalance between firm size and overall profits, the 
more evident the need for digital taxation based on the place where value is created and 
revenues are reaped, rather than the place where the digital company is headquartered.  
 The reaction of the European Union to this first wave of internet transformation was 
initially very slow, then gradually more assertive and determined. The General Data Protection 
Regulation, entered into force in May 2018, is the poster child of a generation of reforms that 
have attempted to restore balance in the digital ecosystem, by establishing principles such as 
“data minimisation” and “user control over data”, which were echoed by legislation in many 
other legal systems, from Brazil to Japan and California. A regulation on the free flow of non-
personal data tried to couple restrictive rules on personal data with expansive rules on non-
personal data flows, so far with little impact. Besides antitrust investigations and fine against 
giants like Google, new regulations expanded the remit of competition rules in areas such as 
the relationship between platforms and businesses (P2B), echoing national rules on abuse of 
economic dependence and abuse of superior bargaining power. After interventions on the tax 
side to counter tax rebates for digital giants such as Apple (in Ireland), work on a web tax has 
started to take shape, alternating with international efforts in the context of the OECD. And the 
first attempts to attribute entitlements over data emerged in the field of agriculture, where a 
code of conduct seeks to empower farmers in reaping value from their data.20 And the 
approach to promoting competition in regulated sectors started to move from traditional access 
obligation related to infrastructure, towards mandatory interoperability obligations, initially 
imposed on industry incumbents, rather than on tech giants: the case of the Second Payment 
Services Directive (PSD2) portrays the awakening of the EU institutions to the use of 
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Application Programming Interfaces as a powerful way to impose interoperability obligations, 
with the (hopefully meaningful) consent of the data subject whose credit data are now moved 
to third party providers.   
 Against this background, the Juncker Commission worked also behind the curtains to 
speed up the reflection on AI rules, on the impact of the digital transformation on labour 
markets, as well as on the achievement of interoperability between administrations at the EU, 
national and local level. All these initiatives took the form of expert reflection (through ad hoc 
high-level groups) or voluntary frameworks (as in the case of ISA2); but had the merit to pave 
the way for an expected acceleration in the coming years, with more binding initiatives. The 
urgency of a reaction to the evolution of the digital ecosystem was felt more strongly by 
Member States, leading in some cases the European Commission to adopt initiatives in the 
attempt to stop the proliferation inconsistent rules at the national level (eg for web taxes, as 
well as for Artificial Intelligence).  
 Overall, the EU’s reaction to the first wave of transformation of the Internet arrived too 
late, leaving the EU behind other superpowers in terms of preparedness and adaptation to the 
new paradigms of the digital economy. As acknowledged also by the European Commission, 
the United States and China have clearly taken the lead on the cloud-dominated, platform-
dominated, machine-learning-led digital environment emerged in the past two decades, and 
only started to concretely react halfway through the Juncker years. The lack of anticipatory 
policymaking, for an inevitably cumbersome bloc of 28 states, created a significant lag between 
the digital transformation and the EU’s policy response. That said, once the EU institutions 
managed to concretely respond, their ability to nest policy proposals into a concrete, solid and 
comprehensive set of principles led to the emergence of the first real corpus of legal rules 
aimed at creating a more socially and economically sustainable environment for the Internet 
age. The complete absence of similar rules in most other legal systems made the EU a real 
pioneer in this policy domain, despite the rather timid approach adopted in several areas. Anu 
Bradford even sees a magnified “Brussels effect” on global digital policy compared to the many 
other areas in which the EU already exerts a significant “normative power Europe”.21 This, in 
turn, encouraged the new European Commission to consider adopting a more assertive 
approach to digital policy, which culminates in a completely new stance on the Single Market. 
 
B. The Second Transformation Wave: the Internet of Things, the Rise of Artificial 
Intelligence and the Emergence of Distributed Architectures 
 
The von der Leyen Commission, already at the end of 2019, took stock of Europe’s competition 
positioning in the digital environment with a degree of despair. Statements on Europe’s lag 
compared to the increasingly battling United States and China proliferated: the world is 
dominated a fistful of cloud operators, most of which American, none of which European; there 
are no European companies among the top 20 global tech firms; the data train has left the 
station, as more than 90% of the data in the Western world are stored in the United States; 
China is going to dominate 5G, as the US rules the world on platforms and applications; Europe 
will never manage to match the level of AI investment of the United States and China. However, 
digital technology never stands still. As policymakers struggle to address the “pacing problem” 
and respond to the first wave of digital transformation, the evolution of technology is already 
paving the way for a transformation in the digital environment. And indeed, the next generation 
if Internet transformation may create new opportunities for Europe to regain its role in the global 
competition for digital solutions.  
 In particular, the next few years will mark the blossoming of the Internet of Things (IoT). 
The physical layer will indeed be enriched by the availability of smart, cyber-physical objects, 
which can enable decentralised data production, communication and processing, requiring 
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storage and intelligence to be increasingly distributed. The projections of the Internet of Things 
are breath-taking, with the number of connected objected poised to skyrocket to one trillion by 
2035.22 More specifically, IoT systems are essentially organised around four main (sub-)layers: 
directly attached to the ‘things’ are sensors, antennas and actuators, which can take a wide 
variety of forms; these devices must be connected to a network layer, which allows the 
aggregation and basic control of data; above these layers (or, as commonly said, above the 
‘edge’) are a first layer of intelligence (Edge IT), which provides analytics functions and pre-
processing of data; and the cloud, in which data are stored, analysed, and processed for 
ultimate action and decision-making, mostly through Artificial Intelligence.  
 The IoT revolution will lead to an expansion of the possibility to automate complex 
processes, but will also require that both data and AI are kept as close as possible to the 
“things”: for example, autonomous vehicles cannot rely on a basic “sensor-to-cloud-and-back” 
model of thinking, since the fact that data have to travel long distances would generate latency 
(for every 100 miles, an estimated 0.82 milliseconds). Looking at different network topologies, 
the immediate alternative to centralised IoT systems would be the implementation of intelligent 
solutions closer to things, and in particular ‘at the edge’. While a fully decentralised system 
would entail ‘embedded AI’ in each of the connected objects, and would therefore be too costly 
using current technologies, most market analysts consider the so-called Edge/Cloud model to 
be the most interesting paradigm for the most sophisticated IoT use cases in the near future.23 
In an edge/cloud model, local computing, storage, and networking resources are provided 
close to IoT devices, and the data generated can be stored and pre-processed by the local 
edge cloud and only a small volume of processed data are eventually sent to central data 
centres.24 
 As already explained, the conventional cloud models will remain viable for a number of 
use cases. However, several emerging applications would strongly require an edge/cloud 
architecture: such a solution can offer important cost savings on top of a more distributed 
structure.25 Performing computations at the network edge has several advantages: (i) the 
volume of data needed to be transferred to a central computing location is reduced because 
some of it is processed by edge devices; (ii) the physical proximity of edge devices to the data 
sources makes it possible to achieve lower latency which improves real-time data processing 
performance; (iii) for the case of data that still must be processed remotely, edge devices can 
be used to discard personally identifiable information (PII) prior to data transfer, thus enhancing 
user privacy and security; (iv)  decentralisation can make systems more robust by providing 
                                                          
 
22 D Gros, ‘Global Trends to 2035: Economy and Society, Report for the European Parliament’ (2019) at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/627126/EPRS_STU(2018)627126_EN.pdf. 
23 A related term, fog computing, describes an architecture where the ‘cloud is extended’ to be closer to the 
IoT end-devices, thereby improving latency and security by performing computations near the network edge. So 
fog and edge computing are related, the main difference being about where the data is processed: in edge 
computing, data is processed directly on the devices to which the sensors are attached (or on gateway devices 
physically very close to the sensors); in fog computing, data is processed further away from the edge, on devices 
connected using a LAN. See A Renda and M Laurer, ‘IoT4SDGs. What can the Digital Transformation and IoT 
achieve for Agenda 2030?’ (2020) Joint CEPS-Hitachi Report.  
24 Several attempts have been made at operationalising an edge/cloud model in the past few years. They 
include projects such as Cloudlet, Nebula, Femtocloud, HomeCloud and Fog Computing. Each of those alternatives 
has pros and cons, and as occurs for transmission protocols, different solutions may fit different use cases. For 
example, the implementation of Network Functions Virtualisation and Software-Defined Networking can provide 
numerous advantages to the dynamic management of edge/cloud systems, especially in the context of 5G 
deployment.  
25 In 2015, for example, David Floyer studied the data management and processing costs of a remote wind-
farm using a cloud-only system versus a combined edge/cloud system. The wind-farm consisted of several data 
producing sensors and devices such as video surveillance cameras, security sensors, access sensors for all 
employees, and sensors on wind-turbines. The edge/cloud system turned out to be 36% less expensive and the 
volume of data required to be transferred was observed to be 96% less, compared to the cloud-only system. D 
Floyer, ‘The Vital Role of Edge Computing in the Internet of Things’ (2015) at https://wikibon.com/the-vital-role-of-
edge-computing-in-the-internet-of-things. 
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transient services during a network failure or cyberattack; (v) edge computing increases 
scalability by expanding compute capacity through a combination of edge and IoT devices. 
 In non-technical terms, it is possible to state that while the AI revolution is the “brain” 
of the digital ecosystem, and the cloud governs its central nervous system, the IoT will 
represent the limbs and muscles, and the edge will act as the peripheral nervous system, 
requiring a degree of automation  and fast-thinking already at the local level. This will require 
a number of important changes in the way the digital economy functions and is organised: 
small data become more important than big data; data storage occurs mostly at the edge and 
in devices; and ore distributed architectures are possible, with possible consequences also for 
competition.  
 While the edge/cloud architecture will become prominent in the next few years, the B2C 
world will also see a possible acceleration, in particular through the emergence of more 
distributed and decentralised architectures, enabling the possibility to store data locally, and in 
a more privacy-preserving way. The emergence of new paradigms for restoring user control 
over personal data, from the IHAN project proposed by the Finnish innovation agency SITRA 
to the approach proposed by the MyData movement and by Tim Berners Lee’s Solid project, 
there is a wealth of ideas for enabling the creation of “data trusts” and other intermediaries, 
able to help end users easily manage their data by selectively sharing the information they 
need to share, without losing control of their diffusion in obscure secondary markets.  
 Most importantly, the new wave of digital transformation promises to achieve very 
substantial progress in the domain of public services, and more generally in the role of 
government. Governments that manage to collect good quality data will be able to develop 
APIs and share them with small and large corporations, researchers and other organisations 
for the development and provision of value-added services. The new age of “Government as 
a platform”, which saw Estonia as a pioneer with its X-Road ecosystem (now available also in 
Finland), promises to revolutionise the relationship between public authorities and citizens, and 
places governments in the driving seat when it comes to securing trust in technology. The 
upcoming information-rich age will require a strong layer of trusted intermediaries, in charge 
of verifying the trustworthiness of data flows: suffice it to consider the fast development of 
“deepfakes”, which contribute to an already rich repertoire of disinformation tools by making it 
almost impossible to distinguish between real and fake audiovisual content.  
 All these developments will determine the final departure of the Internet from its original 
design, and also away from its current architecture. As occurs in the evolution of complex 
organisms in biology, here too the Internet will have to accommodate increased complexity 
due to the co-existence of very different uses, including low-latency industry services enabling 
control through digital replicas (or “twins”), immersive holographic presence and so-called 
“multi-sense media”, alongside with more traditional data flows. Inevitably, the giant technology 
companies of today may have an advantage in conquering also those spaces, which explains 
to a large extent why they continue investing huge sums in R&D. At the same time, the 
competitive space is open to new players, and even more to investment by private and public 
institutions that, from the “real economy”, seek the achievement of a more balanced and 
sustainable internet architecture. This is where the European Union may have an advantage 
over other superpowers, and even vis à vis the current tech giants.  
 
C. Wrapping up: an Evolving Ecosystem 
 
The past few years have been characterized by the rise of a new wave of technological 
developments, which promise to revolutionize the digital economy, bringing it towards and era 
dominated by dramatically superior computing power and connectivity speeds;  a skyrocketing 
number of cyber-physical objects connected to the Internet (the so-called Internet of Things, 
or IoT, powered by nano-technology and by 5G wireless broadband connectivity); and the 
pervasive spread of artificial intelligence into almost all aspects of personal and professional 
life. This new stack will be composed of powerful hardware, including faster processors (mostly 
a combination of CPUs, GPUs and TPUs); distributed computing capacity through edge (or 
fog) computing; new, distributed and decentralized platforms such as blockchain, able to keep 
11 
audit trails of transactions and other asset-backed values; and a pervasive presence of AI-
enabled solutions, mostly in the form of data-hungry techniques such as smart analytics, deep 
learning and reinforcement learning.26 Focusing on all layers of this emerging stack is 
extremely important when it comes to scaling up these technologies to the benefit of society: 
merely focusing on one element, such as AI or blockchain, would not harness the full potential 
of this emerging world.  
 
Figure 1. The old v. new digital technology stack 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 1 above portrays the evolution of the technology stack. The Internet of Things (IoT) 
layer generates an unprecedented amount of data, requiring sensor technology, nano-tech, 
enhanced connectivity through 5G or satellite, and devices like drones or robots, able to 
generate live data remotely27. Regardless of the way in which data are generated, stored and 
exchanges, the use of AI will be ubiquitous in most supply chains. At the top of the supply 
chain, end users very often constitute the “weakest” link, which require the provision of 
adequate skills in using digital technologies (Renda 2019).  
 Although no real estimate of the combined impact of these technologies on the future 
economy exists, several studies have already been published on the economic impact of AI, 
as well as on the impact of IoT in specific sectors. For example, recent reports by 
Accenture/Frontier Economics, McKinsey and PWC conclude that AI will be a game changer 
for total factor productivity and growth, by gradually rising as a third pillar of production, 
together with labour and capital. PWC concluded that by 2030, global GDP will be 14% higher 
due to AI development and diffusion;28 the Accenture study finds that growth rates will be 
doubled by 2035 thanks to AI.29 The latter study also shows an industry-by-industry 
breakdown, which includes agriculture, forestry and fisheries: this sector is expected to more 
than double its growth rate by 2030, from 1.3% to 3.4% on a yearly basis thanks to AI. 
Distributed ledger technologies are expected to complement these developments by solving 
several market failures along supply chains, as well as empowering end users in their 
consumption choices; some commentators go beyond these expectations and foresee a 
revolutionary impact of blockchain in many sectors, but this chiefly depends on whether more 
decentralised architectures will prove scalable over time. 
 
                                                          
 
26 See A Renda, ‘Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Governance and Policy Challenges’ (2019) CEPS Monograph. 
27  Data can be stored in various ways, including through remotely accessible, cloud-enabled solutions; 
through distributed databases; or through distributed ledger technologies such as blockchain. Some of these 
technologies are key enablers of value chain integrity, monitoring and trust, since they produce “audit trails” that 
enhance the verifiability of transactions and contractual performance across the value chain. 
28 PWC, ‘Sizing the Prize. What’s the real value of AI for your business and how can you capitalise?’ (2019) 
PWC Analysis at https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-report.pdf. 
29 M Purdy and P Dougherty, ‘Why Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Growth’ (2017) Accenture/Frontier 
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II. The Single Market 2.0 as a Layered Ecosystem 
 
The previous section embarked into a short description of three decades of digital 
transformation, with a clear objective: to show that technological evolution often opens up new 
possibilities, which must be accounted for in the definition of public policies. In this context, the 
EU is faced with the herculean task of shifting gear towards a more assertive and enlightened 
policy for the Digital Single Market, in a way that preserves its values and at the same time 
boosts its competitiveness and sustainability over the coming years. This will require a 
thorough redefinition of the strategy for the Single Market, to preserve at once its role of 
“workhorse” of European integration, as well as driver of EU international actorness and 
competitiveness. The European Commission has acknowledged in many occasions that there 
can be no “geopolitical Commission” without a strong Single Market at home: even strategies 
aimed at orienting digital technology towards human rights and sustainability require a 
significant market positioning to be credible in internal fora. 
 As already mentioned, the “new” European Commission made a strong commitment to 
the digital transition, positioning the digital environment as a critical infrastructure, and 
postulating the need for digital sovereignty and the twin transition (green and digital) as 
cornerstones of its new geopolitical mission. The adoption of a comprehensive, ambitious data 
strategy and the White Paper on Artificial intelligence paved the way for new policy 
developments that aim, for the first time, at anticipating future market developments by 
achieving a first-mover advantage in the forthcoming second wave of digital transformation. As 
clearly stated by Commissioner Thierry Breton, the European Commission expects that the 
next years will mark a transition towards more distributed, localised data storage, at the edge 
and in devices as opposed to the cloud. While cloud operators will remain important, they will 
be part of a more complex architecture, as we described in Section I.B. This represents at once 
a challenge and an opportunity: on the one hand, it is clear that Europe has missed the first 
train (the B2C wave), and this may deprive it of the resources, the skills and the industrial base 
needed to jump into the second;  on the other hand, the B2B sector is not (yet) dominated by 
the large tech giants, and requires the orchestration of resources from legacy industrial sectors, 
such as manufacturing, automotive, pharma, energy, in which European corporations are often 
market leaders. Similarly, the importance of data flows in (and for) government require action 
to avoid that public institutions end up relying on non-EU players for cloud and software 
solutions: digital sovereignty thus calls for new initiatives aimed at creating a full European 
technology stack. As explained by the European Commission, this assertive approach can and 
should be coupled with concrete commitments to use digital technology “for good”, in particular 
in support of the Green transition: this requires, for example,  that data centres become carbon 
neutral by 2030, and that the IT equipment used in Europe aligns with the requirements of the  
circular economy.30  
The COVID-19 pandemic created a double challenge to the original commitments of the von 
der Leyen Commission. On the one hand, the need for concrete actions to strengthen Europe’s 
digital economy has become even stronger, as most economic and social activities move 
online: an investment in the IoT and the Edge IT layers appears urgent to say the least, in the 
attempt to transform suffering economic sectors, facing an unprecedented nosedive in 
production and turnover. On the other hand, the upcoming depression may lead those sectors 
in dire straits, and thereby in the impossibility to embark in such an ambitious transformation. 
Despite the crisis situation, at the time of writing EU institutions have confirmed their intention 
to proceed as planned on the twin transition: the Council conclusions of 26 March 2020 urged 
the Commission to “get back to a normal functioning of our societies and economies and to 
                                                          
 
30 See the European Commission’s Communication, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, 19 February 2020 at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-shaping-europes-digital-future-feb2020_en_4.pdf. 
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sustainable growth, integrating inter alia the green transition and the digital transformation, and 
drawing all lessons from the crisis.”31  
 The Commission’s response on the twin transition placed the Single Market at the 
forefront, advocating the acceleration towards a “more circular, climate neutral and modernised 
economy”. Current emphasis is however being placed on incremental measures such as 
reinforcing digital skills and making new tools and resources available to SMEs, on the 
reduction of red tape, the strengthening of enforcement in the traditional Single market. Only 
time will tell whether Breton’s original ides of a more forward-looking approach to the Digital 
Single Market will survive the COVID-19 crisis. In order for Europe to realise its ambition to 
preserve and further nurture its actorness and competitiveness at the global level, it is 
important that the Commission realises that the “data train” has not left the station, and that 
Europe has a unique window of opportunity to rely on the new digital transition to boost its 
weight in global economy. This requires a number of initiatives, aimed at rebalancing (or 
restoring) competition in B2C digital markets; create and promote efficient data spaces in the 
B2B domain; pave the way for a distributed and reliable single market for services; enable a 
network of interoperable administrations and leverage eIdentity as a means to empower 
citizens and consumers; and lead the world on the responsible development and use of digital 
technologies.  
 Below, I briefly elaborate on each of those pillars. 
 
A. Rebalancing Competition and Value Allocation in the B2C Domain: from 
Competition Policy to the Federated Cloud Infrastructure 
 
It has become relatively uncontroversial that the “first wave” of digital transformation has 
created positions of excessive power, transforming a fistful of digital players in gatekeepers of 
the Internet, and leading to an excessive concentration of value generated by the digital 
economy.32 There are many ways in which the EU institutions can try to rebalance this 
situation.  
 First, the Commission is likely to reform its competition rules to acknowledge the 
existence of specific situations in which digital players, regardless of market definition, occupy 
a position that grants them “intermediary” power, mostly fuelled by network effects and data 
availability. This move, which would echo the recent debate on the German draft Digitalisation 
Bill, might lead to considering specific remedies, such as the imposition of mandatory 
interoperability for specific datasets, to enable competitors to deploy similar services. This is 
likely at least for specific datasets which can be considered to be essential to develop services 
of general interest, and would be a re-proposition of the essential facilities doctrine, which 
dates back more than two decades in EU competition law, to cases like Magill, IMS Health, 
and Microsoft.33  
                                                          
 
31 See Joint Statement of the Members of the European Council, 26 March 2020 at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/43076/26-vc-euco-statement-en.pdf.  
32 See M Mazzucato, The Value of Everything. Making and Taking in the Global Economy (Penguin Books, 
2018). 
33 See A Renda, ‘Competition-regulation Interface in Telecommunications. What’s left of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine’ (2010) 34(1-2) Telecommunications Policy 23-35. Based on this approach, whenever a dominant market 
player holds an asset of information that is essential for competitors to viably compete in the relevant market, and 
refusal to provide access to this information is likely to either lead to the exit, or even prevent the growth of, ‘as 
efficient’ or even ‘not yet as efficient’ competitors, then competition law may provide for compulsory access 
remedies. Much in the same vein, the German government is now imposing compulsory access obligations to tech 
giants for specific datasets.  In a recent paper for the European Commission’s DG COMP, Jacques Crémer, Yves-
Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer echo this view by observing that “the ability to use data to develop 
new, innovative services and products is a competitive parameter whose relevance will continue to increase”; and 
clarified that “in a number of settings, data access will not be indispensable to compete, and public authorities 
should then refrain from intervention. In other settings, however, duties to ensure data access – and possibly “data 
interoperability” – may have to be imposed”. The paper correctly points out that a “broader diffusion of data is not 
always desirable, either from a social welfare or from a competition perspective” due to privacy concerns; and that 
14 
 Second, in the B2C domain, EU institutions could decide to go beyond data access and 
interoperability obligations, and adopt policies aimed at returning control of their data to end 
users, or even treat data ‘as labour’ whenever possible, as advocated recently by the Report 
of the High Level Expert Group on the Impact of the Digital Transformation on EU Labour 
Markets.34 This would lead to forms of remuneration from digital platforms to end users, which 
may take various forms, including the provision of free services, or most likely a web tax, which 
seems even more likely in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.35 This approach, 
however, would not lead to the creation of more competition in the market, or possibly even 
the entry of European players in the B2C segment. 
 Another area that will prove important to rebalance the bargaining position of market 
players and users in the ecosystem is the effective implementation of recent EU rules on the 
unfair distribution of the contractual surplus among parties in the commercial relation. So-
called “platform-to-business” (P2B) practices have been subject to specific regulation in the 
European Union, where a specific observatory on online platforms has been created in order 
to monitor the application of the regulation. The EU P2B regulation introduces a ban on certain 
unfair practices (eg no more sudden, unexplained account suspensions, plain and intelligible 
terms and advance notice for changes, greater transparency and mandatory disclosure for a 
range of business practices) and new dispute resolution possibilities.36 P2B rules echo similar 
legislation that many countries have enacted in the domains of abuse of economic 
dependency, abuse of superior bargaining power, contract law, or unfair competition. In 
Germany, the draft Digitalisation Bill echoes existing provisions on “relative market power” vis-
á-vis smaller enterprises, by removing any reference to the business size and adding that 
relative market power shall also be assumed for “undertakings acting as intermediaries on 
multi-sided markets insofar as undertakings are dependent on their intermediary services with 
regard to access to supply and sales markets in such a way that sufficient and reasonable 
alternatives do not exist” (Sec 20 para 1 GWB-Draft).37 
 Apart from reforming existing rules, the Commission will also act to restore digital 
sovereignty in the ecosystem, in particular by seeking the creation of a federated cloud 
infrastructure, operating under rules and protocols that embed strict data protection and 
governance requirements. This will most likely take inspiration from the GAIA-X project, 
initiated by France and Germany and already including more than 120 partners. GAIA-X can 
be seen as the quintessential pan-European approach to the future of the Single Market: rather 
than representing a single player competing with the US tech giants, GAIA-X is a federated 
data infrastructure, open to small and large companies, which attempts at once to level the 
playing field, and to embed in the cloud specifications the compatibility with key European 
provisions on security, data protection, openness and transparency, interoperability and trust. 
                                                          
 
in addition to data interoperability, in some cases full protocol interoperability may be needed for competitors to be 
able to compete on an equal footing. 
34 See the Final report of the High-Level Expert Group on the Impact of the Digital Transformation on EU 
Labour Markets, April 2019 at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-
group-impact-digital-transformation-eu-labour-markets. 
35 In that case, the tax would be based on the consideration that the digital platforms derive (some would say, 
extract) value from the end users, who provide data in exchange for being part of the platform: the main theoretical 
argument in favour of such a form of redistribution is the ‘collective action problem’ faced by end users, who are 
structurally unable to place a price on the data they provide, while these data, once aggregated, become extremely 
valuable to the platform. This form of positive externality could be seen as the market failure that a web tax, or any 
other form of redistribution, would seek to remedy 
36 In Australia, similar concerns were expressed during the ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry. Among those 
practice, some may also lead the digital platform to favour its own products, or anyway “preferred” customers on 
the business side, possibly through algorithmic ranking and product placement choices.   
37 Relative market power is to be assumed if undertakings depend on access to data to enter a market; in 
addition, hampering rivals’ attainment of positive network effects can constitute an abuse if this is capable of 
triggering the tipping of a market: this includes case in which a platform adopts measures measures to disable data 
portability or interoperability along with exclusivity clauses or tying practices, to the extent that such measures 
create a “serious risk of a considerable restriction of competition on the merits.” 
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In particular, interoperability is sought at three different infrastructure levels: network, data and 
service, in a way that resembles the approach to interoperability adopted by the European 
Commission to enhance exchanges between EU and national administrations (see below). 
 While still in its infancy, the GAIA-X project represents a gateway towards a next 
generation approach to technology-enabled policymaking at the EU level. It is, in particular, a 
clear response to the emerging edge-cloud infrastructure (as acknowledged in the GAIA-X 
White Paper);38 and a sign of the increased awareness, in the European Commission, of the 
revolutionary potential of the second wave of digital transformation: centralized governance 
does not mean market concentration, especially if a common environment for cloud services 
is coupled with clear data interoperability and portability rules. In this respect, the emphasis on 
common standards and a thicker (three-level) interoperability framework embeds the key 
features of the Single Market 2.0 approach, in continuity with a long-standing approach of the 
European Commission. 
 
B. Securing the B2B Domain: the End of Open Data 
 
Based on our description of the EU strategy above, it is inevitable that the strongest effort of 
the new Commission will be concentrated in the B2B domain, where the emergence of the IoT 
and the edge/cloud infrastructure powered by 5G and other forms of connectivity call for a new 
approach to industrial policy. This seems to lead to a combination of data strategy and 
industrial policy, both adopted by the von der Leyen Commission under the auspices of 
Commissioner Breton in the first 100 days of the Commission’s mandate.  
 The data strategy announces the objective to create a single European data space and 
couple it with measures aimed at ensuring that by 2030, the EU’s share of the data economy 
corresponds to its economic weight (“not by fiat but by choice”, the Commission adds). The 
idea of creating a “genuine single market for data” leads to an upgrade of the “free flow of non-
personal data” approach that emerged during the Juncker Commission. Even if the 
Commission is very cautious not to venture into too assertive statements, it emerges clearly 
that in the B2B domain, the age of “open data”, free-flowing information as a means to the 
promotion of innovation is definitely over. The need to avoid capture of industrial data by large 
tech giants, and imbalances in the distribution of revenues along the value chain, leads the 
Commission to propose the creation of a two-layer architecture, with an overarching single 
European data space and a number of domain- or mission-specific data spaces. The stated 
reasons for this move are the fragmentation between national data policies, and the 
persistence of significant constraints to all types of data flows; the existence of imbalances of 
market power; problems of data quality and interoperability; lack of adequate provisions for 
data governance; and a collection of other problems on both the supply and the demand side 
of data, including security aspects, regulatory certainty, and skills.  
 The result is the proposed creation of a series of large pools of data in specific domains, 
combined with the technical tools and infrastructures necessary to use and exchange data, as 
well as appropriate governance mechanisms. These pools (renamed “data spaces”) require 
the adoption of a horizontal framework complemented by sectoral legislation for data access 
and use, and mechanisms for ensuring interoperability, and must be developed in full 
compliance with data protection rules and according to the highest available cyber-security 
standards. Such framework will be adopted by the end of 2020, and will need to be 
complemented by policies that stimulate the use of data and demand for services enriched 
with data.39 Apart from the governance aspects of data space management, which are still 
unknown, it is clear that data spaces are a key component of the Commission’s new vision for 
                                                          
 
38 See Project GAIA-X. ‘A Federated Data Infrastructure as the Cradle of a Vibrant European Ecosystem’ 
available at https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Digitale-Welt/project-gaia-
x.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4. 
39 See the Commission’s Work Programme 2020 at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-commission-
work-programme-key-documents_en.  
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data-driven industrial policy, and aim at realising at once a rebalancing effect (keep 
entitlements over data in the hands of industrial players) and a repatriation effect (ensure that 
data are stored and managed according to European rules, and preferably in the territory of 
the EU).  
 The data spaces proposed by the Commission in its data strategy, as already 
mentioned, are in some cases cross-sectoral, in others more sector-specific. Among the cross-
sectoral ones are a “Green Deal data space”, which is expected to mobilise public and private 
data to help achieve Europe’s environmental goals, even by creating a digital twin of the Earth; 
a Common European skills data space, aimed at reducing skills mismatches in the labour 
market; and European data spaces for the public administration, aimed at strengthening data 
exchanges, promoting transparency and accountability, fighting corruption, and enabling 
GovTech solutions. More sectoral solutions are devoted to manufacturing, mobility, health, 
finance, energy and agriculture.  
 The data spaces approach must be analysed in conjunction with the Industrial Strategy 
communications, adopted by the Commission in March 2020.40 The strategy, though mostly 
focused on the real economy and on related topics such as innovation and entrepreneurship 
as well as industry alliances and the “analogue” Single Market, places strong emphasis on the 
concept of industrial ecosystems, which are not clearly defined in the Communication. One of 
the most crucial aspects of the new ecosystems approach is whether they will be defined as 
coinciding with industry sectors (eg aviation), or in a mission-oriented way (eg mobility). Data 
spaces have been defined according to the latter approach, but the COVID-19 crisis may call 
for a more sector-specific approach to industry support and aid. The new approach to the 
Single Market 2.0 would preferably preserve the mission-oriented approach, as well as its 
vocation towards sustainable development in a technology-neutral way.  
 
C. A Distributed Single Market for Services  
 
Above the infrastructure and data governance layers, the Single Market 2.0 will enable different 
forms of governance, from centralised to more distributed and decentralised. One interesting 
characteristic of the digital economy, in this respect, is that the traditional barriers to entry in 
the form of economies of scale are less likely to materialise, especially in the service economy. 
The servitisation of the economy describe in Section I above makes it possible for very small 
businesses to use powerful IT equipment, rent drones and even tractors or other costly 
machinery “as a service”. The rise of 3D printing decentralises the production and assembling 
of products, drastically reducing costs. For example, in agriculture communities of farmers can 
then access modern technology at a fraction of the cost, and only for the time needed.41 
However, as already recalled these barriers to entry are being replaced by less tangible ones, 
notably represented by data access and management, as well as related skills.  
 The new technological frontier, coupled with interoperability rules, will make further 
servitization possible, alongside with the adoption of more distributed governance structures, 
thereby enabling greater market competition. Industrial economics will fundamentally change, 
unveiling the possibility to address issues in a centralised, distributed or decentralised way, as 
depicted in figure 2 below. In some cases, a centralised architecture (for example, exclusively 
cloud-based) may emerge, thereby triggering network externalities and winner-take-all 
competition; in other situations, a decentralised structure may lead to edge/cloud architectures 
and federated structures organised along a limited number of “supernodes”; and finally, with 
technological development even fully distributed structures, with service provision among 
peers, become increasingly possible.  
                                                          
 
40 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A New Industrial Strategy for 
Europe’, COM(2020)102 final, 10 March 2020. 
41 See Renda et al, above n 20. 
17 
 
Figure 2 – Centralised, decentralised and distributed computing 
 
Source: Truong et al. (2016)42 
 
In more concrete terms, this may mean that in some markets, a large number of small 
corporations may end up competing for services, by using data made available through 
widespread interoperability requirements. This comes very close to the IHAN model proposed 
by SITRA, which de facto re-proposes the PSD2 “open API” approach at a wider scale, 
commoditising data availability (hopefully, implementing privacy-preserving arrangements) 
and laying the foundations for a more competitive, pluralistic Single Market for services. 
Maximising data availability will also mean liberating all possible sources of data flow, including 
the use of public sector information by business (G2B); sharing and use of privately-held data 
by other companies (B2B); the use of privately-held data by government authorities when 
appropriate and desirable (B2G); and data-sharing between public authorities (G2G).  In this 
respect, all other pillars of the proposed new framework for the Single Market 2.0 are essential 
to feed the new services market. For example, public administrations (as defined in more detail 
below) could enable innovation by acting as platforms and offering open APIs to citizens and 
businesses, thereby significantly lowering the data barrier to entry. Widespread, privacy-
compatible data availability throughout the Union can also contribute to the environment by 
enabling more localised solutions. In a nutshell, the Single Market 2.0 would be more 
integrated (through data flows), competitive (through data interoperability), decentralised 
(through lower data barriers to entry) and environmentally sustainable (through lower transport 
costs, as well as carbon-neutral data centres).  
 Such a vision requires, inevitably, the support of modernised legal rules. In particular, 
the scope of most product liability regimes does not include intangible goods, implying that 
cases of inadequate services, careless advice, erroneous diagnostics and flawed information 
are as such not covered. A comparable situation exists in the field of product safety regulation, 
which so far has not been accompanied by a regulatory framework in the field of safety of 
services. In all these fields, the EU acquis appears far from complete, and will require more 
attention in the years to come. The upcoming Digital Service Act should fill this gap by clarifying 
the conditions for the liability of online service providers and intermediaries. The needed 
update of the Product Liability Directive will most certainly entail a revision of key definitions 
such as “product” and “producer”, as well as rules on certain practices adopted by service 
providers vis à vis end users, such as price personalisation through automated decision-
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making and profiling. In other words, the body of rules that supports the new vision of the 
Single Market should be able to generate sufficient trust among end users, as will be explained 
in more detail in Section II.E below. 
 
D. Digital Government and eIdentity 
 
Data availability and user-centric innovation in the future Single Market 2.0 would greatly 
benefit from a proactive role of government in the generation, collection, protection and 
provision of data. This can occur through ad hoc data trusts, or simply by public administrations 
acting as orchestrators of the data economy. The European Commission has gone a long way 
in creating the preconditions for the interoperability between administrations in Europe, in 
particular through its ISA2 programme, which led to the development of re-usable building 
blocks, available to national and local governments on a purely voluntary basis. However, that 
framework has led to a very low uptake, and would need to be converted into a much more 
concerted action for the development of digital government and “government as a platform” 
approaches in Europe: this includes measures included in the semester, in the InvestEU and 
Digital Europe programmes, and dedicated support through the newly created DG REFORM. 
The swift transition towards digital government solutions is even more urgent since the 
Ministerial Declaration on e-Government in Tallinn on 6 October 2017, in which the Ministers 
in charge of e-Government policy from 32 countries of the European Union (EU) and the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) unanimously committed to the vision laid out in the EU e-
Government Action Plan 2016-2020 and in the new European Interoperability Framework that 
public administrations and public institutions in the EU should be open, efficient and inclusive, 
providing borderless, interoperable, personalised, user-friendly, end-to-end digital public 
services to all citizens and businesses – at all levels of public administration43. This includes, 
i.a., the development of more efficient and user-centric digital services; a call on the EU 
institutions to develop more interoperable, efficient, open and transparent administrative 
procedures to best serve their citizens and interoperate with all levels of government.44 The 
ISA2 programme will leave, as important legacy, a layered approach aimed at building the 
foundations of the Single Market 2.0 by ensuring a high level of legal, organisational, semantic 
and technical interoperability between administrations.  
 EU institutions should take the timeline of the Tallinn declaration seriously: they have 
agreed at the end of 2017 to achieve six targets within five years: digital by default and 
inclusiveness; application of the “once only principle”; secure trusted electronic identification 
and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market; enable the possibility for 
people and business to access personal data held by the public administrations; integrate 
instruments and a call to public authorities to oblige cross-border interoperable solution 
compatibles with European frameworks and standards; and improve the digital leadership 
skills and the IT education in every level of the public administrations.45 
 Among these commitments, as particularly important for the development of the whole 
Single European data space will be the area of digital verification, encompassing both digital 
identify (eID) and electronic trust services (eTS), altogether subsumed under an EU framework 
for authentication in digital transactions (eIDAS). eIDAS sets the standards and criteria for 
simple electronic signature, advanced electronic signature, qualified electronic signature, 
qualified certificates and online trust services. Furthermore, it rules electronic transactions and 
their management. Among other benefits, it fully recognizes digital means of verification that 
are considered to be equivalent to physical presence. In doing so, it lays the foundations for 
the creation of the Single European Data space. The system could in the future be updated to 
include other means of verification (eg fingerprint scan) and create a new system for 







certification of digital ID in the Single Market 2.0. It should also be complemented by trustless 
(or better, trust-enhancing) mechanism for time-stamping, origin-stamping and other 
transaction authentication methods offered by Distributed Ledger Technologies (including fully 
privacy-preserving ways such as zero knowledge proofs).  
 
E. Leading the World on Digital Technology “for good” 
 
As already remarked in the previous section, a key pillar of the emerging Single Market 2.0 will 
necessarily have to be the trustworthiness of its infrastructure, protocols, rules, and services. 
In this respect, the EU has the responsibility and the opportunity to lead the world in the 
development of a trusted digital environment and has already started to do so in the domain 
of Artificial Intelligence. In the AI field, the European Commission (backed by an ad hoc High 
Level Expert Group (AI HLEG), advocated the transition towards “Trustworthy Artificial 
Intelligence”, defined as AI that meets three cumulative requirements: legal compliance, ethical 
alignment, and socio-technical robustness. The AI HLEG identified four key principles (defined 
as ethical “imperatives”) for Trustworthy AI: the respect for human autonomy, the prevention 
of harm, fairness and explicability.46  These principles were further broken down into seven 
requirements, which were then operationalized into an Assessment List on Trustworthy AI 
(ALTAI). This strategy arrived at a turning point with the White Paper adopted on February 19, 
2020 (together with the new EU strategy for data), in which the von der Leyen Commission 
announces the adoption of a flexible, agile regulatory framework limited to ‘high-risk’ 
applications, in sectors such as healthcare, transport, police and the judiciary; and focusing on 
provisions related to data quality and traceability, transparency and human oversight. A 
legislative initiative on AI is now expected by the end of 2020, as outlined in the Work 
Programme of the European Commission, which envisages a follow-up to the White Paper, 
including on safety, liability, fundamental rights and data.  
 The EU agenda on AI inspired many other countries and international organisations, 
including the OECD principles on AI, the G20 human-centred AI Principles, as well as the “AI 
for good” within the International Telecommunications Union. This revived the EU’s actorness 
in the digital technology space, where it is now a recognized standard-setter, and perhaps the 
only superpower able to credible orchestrate a dialogue on responsible uses of digital 
technologies (starting with AI). In order to sustain high standards in this domain, as already 
recalled, the EU will need to rely on a vibrant Single Market, to be leveraged through extra-
territorial rules to avoid that EU products are outcompeted by non-European, less sustainable 
standards.  
 
III. Conclusion: towards a New Architecture for the Single Market 2.0 
 
The five pillars of the Single Market 2.0 illustrated in Section II are certainly a non-exhaustive 
account of the possible future of Europe’s “crown jewel”. Compared to the architecture of the 
Internet shown in Figure 1 above, the new Single Market would look more articulate, but not 
necessarily more complex from an end user perspective. As shown in figure 3, the Single 
Market 2.0 would have an extensive infrastructure layer, composed of connected things, the 
edge IT layer, various connectivity protocols (including 5G and many others) and the federated 
cloud infrastructure. Above that layer, the traditional logical layer would be flanked by a legal, 
identity/trust and semantic interoperability layer, which will then support the emerging cross-
cutting and sector-specific data spaces. These will cover most of the Single Market 2.0 from a 
B2B perspective, whereas the B2C will be more similar to the current Internet ecosystem. An 
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important role could be played by G2C and G2B services with public administration becoming 
real catalysts of social innovation.47 
 
 
Figure 3 – A sketched architecture of Single Market 2.0 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
This, inevitably, is only a sketch of the main components of the future Single Market 2.0, which 
will certainly be even more complex. The role of technologies such as blockchain and other 
DLTs in enabling transactions and fostering the so-called token economy is one of many 
aspects that will emerge over the next few years, and which are difficult to fully anticipate at 
the time of writing. The digital environment, as I have tried to explain throughout these pages, 
is an ever-changing multi-layered ecosystem, which becomes thicker as time goes by, and 
where the technological evolution defines the frontier of what is possible in a constantly 
evolving way.  
 The EU finds itself in a relatively favourable position at least in some of the layers 
portrayed in Figure 3. This is the case for 5G connectivity, an area in which EU companies like 
Nokia and Ericsson are rivalled (and complemented) by Chinese and South Korean players, 
and are way ahead of their North American counterparts; in the development of a federated 
cloud, thanks to the initiative of Member States; in the availability of a pan-European framework 
for digital verification, an soon also in the development of a governance framework for data 
spaces. The EU is also leading the world in responsible AI, in trusted blockchain applications 
and in a number of industrial B2B applications, from manufacturing to healthcare. Against this 
background, the looming economic recession, the oscillating trust and commitment of Member 
States and the lack of agility of EU institutions may stand in the way of a rapid shift towards a 
more vibrant, future-proof Single Market. Absent political commitment and a good dose of 
enlightened policymaking, the European Union risks missing also the second wave of digital 
transformation: afterwards, new waves will certainly come, yet catching up may prove 
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